Home page  

The Columbia Generating Station (CGS), formerly known as WPPSS Nuclear Plant #2

Near-Term Task Force
Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident
July 12, 2011

After Fukushima, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) convened a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to evaluate whether safety upgrades were needed at U.S. nuclear plants. But some of the key task force recommendations have not been adopted by the NRC.


The task force report found deficiencies in the current regulations and made 12 recommendations for improvements.

Key recommendations:

#1: Establish a “logical, systematic and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations”
#2: Require re-evaluation and upgrading of design-basis seismic and flooding hazards

#4: Strengthen station blackout mitigation capability for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events

#5: Require “reliable” hardened vents for Mark I and II BWRs

#7: Enhance spent fuel pool mitigation and instrumentation

#8: Strengthen and integrate onsite emergency response capabilities (eg. SAMGs and B.5.b)

Additional issues (post -NTTF)

  • Emergency planning zone size (evacuation and KI distribution)

  • Filtered and/or severe accident capable vents

  • Expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry casks

The following Task Force recommendations were accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

  • Re-examine risks of earthquakes and flooding (#2)

  • Require additional emergency equipment that can be used during extended losses of alternating current power (#4)

  • Require “reliable” and “severe accident capable” vents for Mark I and II BWRs (#5)

  • Require reliable spent fuel pool instrumentation (#7)

Task Force recommendations  the NRC has postponed or rejected:

  • Revising the regulatory framework (#1) NO
  • Requiring filters for BWR containment vents DECISION POSTPONED
  • Expanding emergency evacuation planning zones beyond 10 miles NO
    Japan has done it – why not the U.S.?
  • Requiring accelerated transfer of spent fuel from pools to safer dry casks NO
    Defense-in-depth measure to reduce fire impacts

Adapted from a PowerPoint presentation by Dr. Edwin Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists (see slides 33 and following).


About us       Contact us       Search this site

Nuclear Free Northwest Home Page